1. On April 1, the IDF hit a building in Damascus used by the IRGC, which Iran falsely claimed was a “consulate” and therefore, sovereign Iranian territory. It was, in fact, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) headquarters in Syria. There were no consular officials in the building. Seven people, all of them military men, including the IRGC commander for Syria and Lebanon, Mohamed Reza Zahedi, were killed. Iran promised it would avenge their deaths.
Iran’s Attack on Israel: What We Know So Far
SEE: https://www.jihadwatch.org/2024/04/irans-attack-on-israel-what-we-know-so-far; republished below in full, unedited, for informational, educational, & research purposes:
2. On the night of April 13, Iran launched an attack consisting of some 170 drones, 130 ballistic missiles, and 30 cruise missiles on Israel. This attack was described by the Biden administration as a grossly “disproportionate” response to Israel’s April 1 attack in Damascus.
3. 99% of the drones and missiles launched from Iran toward Israel were shot down before they could land in Israel, many even before they entered Israeli airspace. From the handful — about three — drones or missiles that did manage to land, there was very little damage. No one was killed, and only one girl, in the Negev, was hurt by shrapnel.
4. The Americans apparently were responsible for intercepting “dozens” of Iranian drones. The more they have shot down, the greater Israel’s gratitude will be to the Americans, and the Bidenites hope that it will help them convince the Israelis not to engage in further “escalation,” but to keep their retaliation “proportionate” to Iran’s attack. If, on the other hand, Israel is convinced that by itself it managed to shoot down almost all — say, 90% — of the drones and missiles, it will be less beholden to the Americans urging them to limit their response, and more likely to respond with greater force to Iran’s attack than the Americans would have liked.
5. Other Western allies, including the U.K., France, and Italy, also took part in intercepting Iranian drones and missiles in the skies over Jordan. It is believed the RAF was responsible for at least a few successful intercepts. Having been the subject of so much criticism from those countries over the war in Gaza, it must cheer the Israelis up that these countries came so readily to Israel’s aid in intercepting Iran’s missiles and drones.
6. Jordan and Saudi Arabia also participated in efforts to shoot down Iranian drones and missiles as those flew over their Jordanian air space. It is not known what success they may have had, but their clear effort to help stymie the Iranian effort reminds us that the Sunni Arab states understand that Shi’a Iran, with its network of proxies and allies, is a threat to their wellbeing. Israel, on the other hand, is not.
7. Iran has now tried to put a stop to any Israeli retaliation, with the Islamic Republic’s UN Ambassador declaring that Iran considered the matter “over.” It hopes thereby to avoid an Israeli response to its massive, but in the end massively unsuccessful, attack on the Jewish state. For Israel, of course, the latest exchange will not be “over” until Israel has retaliated with much greater force to this Iranian attack, to make sure that Iran does not try its luck yet again.
8. Washington recognizes the hugely “disproportionate” nature of Iran’s latest attack. It must know that it cannot prevent a retaliatory attack on Iran by Israel, but it is likely urging the Israelis to exercise “restraint.” Exactly what kind of “restraint” Israel should show is entirely unclear. Should it limit its attack to the same number of drones and missiles that Iran launched in its attack? Or should it take this occasion, when much of the world is now, however briefly, on its side, to deal a devastating blow to Iran’s offensive capabilities, taking out most of its remaining drones and ballistic missiles, and attacking its nuclear facilities? Isn’t now the time to put paid to the Iranian military threat, when sympathy for Israel is momentarily high, by launching what will no doubt be seen by many, so often quick to blame Israel for being a troublemaker, as a “disproportionate” attack?
9. If Israel now goes ahead with that “disproportionate” response, and inflicts great damage to Iran’s missiles and drones, and to its nuclear program, Sunni Arab countries will not object. Instead, they will be quietly pleased that their great enemy, the Islamic Republic of Iran, has been decisively weakened.
10. Israel could, of course, not retaliate immediately, but keep the Iranians in a state of high anxiety for months, wondering when the IDF will finally attack. No need for Israel to announce its plans in advance. We need only say that “we will retaliate for the April 13 attack by Iran at a time and place of our choosing.”
11. The Bidenites are likely to try to dissuade Israel from a massive response, lest the violence “spiral out of control.” They may try to persuade the Israelis to limit themselves to a handful of targets. I’d say that with its massive April 13 attack, Iran has already caused the violence to “spiral out of control.” It is Iran that needs to be reined in. Israel should express its gratitude to “our great ally and friend, the United States” for its assistance in intercepting Iranian drones and missiles, but still ignore Washington’s advice to be measured in its response to Iran. It should use the occasion, when much of the world is on its side, to inflict great damage on Iran’s nuclear program and on its ballistic missile program.