Although FDR desired to directly involve the United States in the
Second World War, his intentions sharply contradicted his public
pronouncements. A pre-war Gallup poll showed 88 percent of Americans
opposed U.S. involvement in the European war. Citizens realized that
U.S. participation in World War I had not made a better world, and in a
1940 (election-year) speech, Roosevelt typically stated: “I have said
this before, but I shall say it again and again and again: Your boys are
not going to be sent into any foreign wars.”

But privately, the president planned the opposite. Roosevelt
dispatched his closest advisor, Harry Hopkins, to meet British Prime
Minister Winston Churchill in January 1941. Hopkins told Churchill: “The
President is determined that we [the United States and England] shall
win the war together. Make no mistake about it. He has sent me here to
tell you that at all costs and by all means he will carry you through,
no matter what happens to him — there is nothing he will not do so far
as he has human power.” William Stevenson noted in A Man Called Intrepid
that American-British military staff talks began that same month under
“utmost secrecy,” which, he clarified, “meant preventing disclosure to
the American public.” Even Robert Sherwood, the president’s friendly
biographer, said: “If the isolationists had known the full extent of the
secret alliance between the United States and Britain, their demands
for impeachment would have rumbled like thunder throughout the land.”

Background to Betrayal

Roosevelt’s intentions were nearly exposed in 1940 when Tyler Kent, a
code clerk at the U.S. embassy in London, discovered secret dispatches
between Roosevelt and Churchill. These revealed that FDR — despite
contrary campaign promises — was determined to engage America in the
war. Kent smuggled some of the documents out of the embassy, hoping to
alert the American public — but was caught. With U.S. government
approval, he was tried in a secret British court and confined to a
British prison until the war’s end.

During World War II’s early days, the president offered numerous
provocations to Germany: freezing its assets; shipping 50 destroyers to
Britain; and depth-charging U-boats. The Germans did not retaliate,
however. They knew America’s entry into World War I had shifted the
balance of power against them, and they shunned a repeat of that
scenario. FDR therefore switched his focus to Japan. Japan had signed a
mutual defense pact with Germany and Italy (the Tripartite Treaty).
Roosevelt knew that if Japan went to war with the United States, Germany
and Italy would be compelled to declare war on America — thus
entangling us in the European conflict by the back door. As Harold
Ickes, secretary of the Interior, said in October 1941: “For a long time
I have believed that our best entrance into the war would be by way of
Japan.”

Much new light has been shed on Pearl Harbor through the recent work
of Robert B. Stinnett, a World War II Navy veteran. Stinnett has
obtained numerous relevant documents through the Freedom of Information
Act. In Day of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor
(2000), the book so brusquely dismissed by director Bruckheimer,
Stinnett reveals that Roosevelt’s plan to provoke Japan began with a
memorandum from Lieutenant Commander Arthur H. McCollum, head of the Far
East desk of the Office of Naval Intelligence. The memorandum advocated
eight actions predicted to lead Japan into attacking the United States.
McCollum wrote: “If by these means Japan could be led to commit an
overt act of war, so much the better.” FDR enacted all eight of
McCollum’s provocative steps — and more.

While no one can excuse Japan’s belligerence in those days, it is
also true that our government provoked that country in various ways —
freezing her assets in America; closing the Panama Canal to her
shipping; progressively halting vital exports to Japan until we finally
joined Britain in an all-out embargo; sending a hostile note to the
Japanese ambassador implying military threats if Tokyo did not alter its
Pacific policies; and on November 26th — just 11 days before the
Japanese attack — delivering an ultimatum that demanded, as
prerequisites to resumed trade, that Japan withdraw all troops from
China and Indochina, and in effect abrogate her Tripartite Treaty with
Germany and Italy.

After meeting with President Roosevelt on October 16, 1941, Secretary
of War Henry Stimson wrote in his diary: “We face the delicate question
of the diplomatic fencing to be done so as to be sure Japan is put into
the wrong and makes the first bad move — overt move.” On November 25,
the day before the ultimatum was sent to Japan’s ambassadors, Stimson
wrote in his diary: “The question was how we should maneuver them [the
Japanese] into the position of firing the first shot….”

The bait offered Japan was our Pacific Fleet. In 1940, Admiral J.O.
Richardson, the fleet’s commander, flew to Washington to protest FDR’s
decision to permanently base the fleet in Hawaii instead of its normal
berthing on the U.S. West Coast. The admiral had sound reasons: Pearl
Harbor was vulnerable to attack, being approachable from any direction;
it could not be effectively rigged with nets and baffles to defend
against torpedo planes; and in Hawaii it would be hard to supply and
train crews for his undermanned vessels. Pearl Harbor also lacked
adequate fuel supplies and dry docks, and keeping men far from their
families would create morale problems. The argument became heated. Said
Richardson: “I came away with the impression that, despite his spoken
word, the President was fully determined to put the United States into
the war if Great Britain could hold out until he was reelected.”

Richardson was quickly relieved of command. Replacing him was Admiral
Husband E. Kimmel. Kimmel also informed Roosevelt of Pearl Harbor’s
deficiencies, but accepted placement there, trusting that Washington
would notify him of any intelligence pointing to attack. This proved to
be misplaced trust. As Washington watched Japan preparing to assault
Pearl Harbor, Admiral Kimmel, as well as his Army counterpart in Hawaii,
General Walter C. Short, were completely sealed off from the
information pipeline.

Prior Knowledge

One of the most important elements in America’s foreknowledge of
Japan’s intentions was our government’s success in cracking Japan’s
secret diplomatic code known as “Purple.” Tokyo used it to communicate
to its embassies and consulates, including those in Washington and
Hawaii. The code was so complex that it was enciphered and deciphered by
machine. A talented group of American cryptoanalysts broke the code in
1940 and devised a facsimile of the Japanese machine. These, utilized by
the intelligence sections of both the War and Navy departments, swiftly
revealed Japan’s diplomatic messages. The deciphered texts were
nicknamed “Magic.”

Copies of Magic were always promptly delivered in locked pouches to
President Roosevelt, and the secretaries of State, War, and Navy. They
also went to Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall and to the
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold Stark. However, although three
Purple decoding machines were allotted to Britain, none was sent to
Pearl Harbor. Intercepts of ciphered messages radioed between Tokyo and
its Honolulu consulate had to be forwarded to Washington for decrypting.
Thus Kimmel and Short, the Hawaiian commanders, were at the mercy of
Washington for feedback. A request for their own decoding machine was
rebuffed on the grounds that diplomatic traffic was of insufficient
interest to soldiers.

How untrue that was! On October 9, 1941, the War Department decoded a
Tokyo-to-Honolulu dispatch instructing the Consul General to divide
Pearl Harbor into five specified areas and to report the exact locations
of American ships therein.

There is nothing unusual about spies watching ship movements
— but reporting precise whereabouts of ships in dock has only one
implication. Charles Willoughby, Douglas MacArthur’s chief of
intelligence, later wrote that the “reports were on a grid system of the
inner harbor with coordinate locations of American men of war …
coordinate grid is the classical method for pinpoint target designation;
our battleships had suddenly become targets.” This information was
never sent to Kimmel or Short.

Additional intercepts were decoded by Washington, all within one day of their original transmission:

• November 5th: Tokyo notified its Washington ambassadors that November 25th was the deadline for an agreement with the U.S.

• November 11th: They were warned, “The situation is nearing a climax, and the time is getting short.”

• November 16th: The deadline was pushed up to November 29th. “The
deadline absolutely cannot be changed,” the dispatch said. “After that,
things are automatically going to happen.”

• November 29th (the U.S. ultimatum had now been received): The
ambassadors were told a rupture in negotiations was “inevitable,” but
that Japan’s leaders “do not wish you to give the impression that
negotiations are broken off.”

• November 30th: Tokyo ordered its Berlin embassy to inform the
Germans that “the breaking out of war may come quicker than anyone
dreams.”

• December 1st: The deadline was again moved ahead. “[T]o prevent the
United States from becoming unduly suspicious, we have been advising
the press and others that … the negotiations are continuing.”

• December 1st-2nd: The Japanese embassies in non-Axis nations around
the world were directed to dispose of their secret documents and all
but one copy of their codes. (This was for a reason easy to fathom —
when war breaks out, the diplomatic offices of a hostile state lose
their immunity and are normally overtaken. One copy of code was retained
so that final instructions could be received, after which the last code
copy would be destroyed.)

An additional warning came via the so-called “winds” message. A
November 18th intercept indicated that, if a break in U.S. relations
were forthcoming, Tokyo would issue a special radio warning. This would
not be in the Purple code, as it was intended to reach consulates and
lesser agencies of Japan not equipped with the code or one of its
machines. The message, to be repeated three times during a weather
report, was “Higashi no kaze ame,” meaning “East wind, rain.” “East
wind” signified the United States; “rain” signified diplomatic split —
in effect, war.

This prospective message was deemed so significant that U.S. radio
monitors were constantly watching for it, and the Navy Department typed
it up on special reminder cards. On December 4th, “Higashi no kaze ame”
was indeed broadcast and picked up by Washington intelligence.

On three different occasions since 1894, Japan had made surprise
attacks coinciding with breaks in diplomatic relations. This history was
not lost on President Roosevelt. Secretary Stimson, describing FDR’s
White House conference of November 25th, noted: “The President said the
Japanese were notorious for making an attack without warning and stated
that we might be attacked, say next Monday, for example.” Nor was it
lost on Washington’s senior military officers, all of them War College
graduates.

As Robert Stinnett has revealed, Washington was not only deciphering Japanese diplomatic messages, but naval dispatches
as well. President Roosevelt had access to these intercepts via his
routing officer, Lieutenant Commander McCollum, who had authored the
original eight-point plan of provocation to Japan. So much secrecy has
surrounded these naval dispatches that their existence was not revealed
during any of the ten Pearl Harbor investigations, even the mini-probe
Congress conducted in 1995. Most of Stinnett’s requests for documents
concerning Pearl Harbor have been denied as still classified, even under
the Freedom of Information Act.

It was long presumed that as the Japanese fleet approached Pearl
Harbor, it maintained complete radio silence. This is untrue. The fleet
barely observed discretion, let alone silence. Naval intelligence
intercepted and translated numerous dispatches, some clearly revealing
that Pearl Harbor had been targeted. The most significant was the
following, sent by Admiral Yamamoto to the Japanese First Air Fleet on
November 26, 1941:

So much official secrecy continues to surround the translations of
the intercepted Japanese naval dispatches that it is not known if the
foregoing message was sent to McCollum or seen by FDR. It is not even
known who originally translated the intercept. One thing, however, is
certain: The message’s significance could not have been lost on the
translator.

1941 also witnessed the following:

On January 27th, our ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, sent a message
to Washington stating: “The Peruvian Minister has informed a member of
my staff that he has heard from many sources, including a Japanese
source, that in the event of trouble breaking out between the United
States and Japan, the Japanese intended to make a surprise attack
against Pearl Harbor with all their strength….”

On November 3rd, still relying on informants, Grew notified Secretary
of State Cordell Hull: “War with the United States may come with
dramatic and dangerous suddenness.” He sent an even stronger warning on
November 17th.

Congressman Martin Dies would write:

Dusko Popov was a Yugoslav who worked as a double agent for both
Germany and Britain. His true allegiance was to the Allies. In the
summer of 1941, the Nazis ordered Popov to Hawaii to make a detailed
study of Pearl Harbor and its nearby airfields. The agent deduced that
the mission betokened a surprise attack by the Japanese. In August, he
fully reported this to the FBI in New York. J. Edgar Hoover later
bitterly recalled that he had provided warnings to FDR about Pearl
Harbor, but that Roosevelt told him not to pass the information any
further and to just leave it in his (the president’s) hands.

Kilsoo Haan, of the Sino-Korean People’s League, received definite
word from the Korean underground that the Japanese were planning to
assault Hawaii “before Christmas.” In November, after getting nowhere
with the State Department, Haan convinced Iowa Senator Guy Gillette of
his claim’s merit. Gillette briefed the president, who laconically
thanked him and said it would be looked into.

In Java, in early December, the Dutch Army decoded a dispatch from
Tokyo to its Bangkok embassy, forecasting attacks on four sites
including Hawaii. The Dutch passed the information to Brigadier General
Elliot Thorpe, the U.S. military observer. Thorpe sent Washington a
total of four warnings. The last went to General Marshall’s intelligence
chief. Thorpe was ordered to send no further messages concerning the
matter. The Dutch also had their Washington military attaché, Colonel
Weijerman, personally warn General Marshall.

Captain Johann Ranneft, the Dutch naval attaché in Washington, who
was awarded the Legion of Merit for his services to America, recorded
revealing details in his diary. On December 2nd, he visited the Office
of Naval Intelligence (ONI). Ranneft inquired about the Pacific. An
American officer, pointing to a wall map, said, “This is the Japanese
Task Force proceeding East.” It was a spot midway between Japan and
Hawaii. On December 6th, Ranneft returned and asked where the Japanese
carriers were. He was shown a position on the map about 300-400 miles
northwest of Pearl Harbor. Ranneft wrote: “I ask what is the meaning of
these carriers at this location; whereupon I receive the answer that it
is probably in connection with Japanese reports of eventual American
action…. I myself do not think about it because I believe that
everyone in Honolulu is 100 percent on the alert, just like everyone
here at O.N.I.”

On November 29th, Secretary of State Cordell Hull secretly met with
freelance newspaper writer Joseph Leib. Leib had formerly held several
posts in the Roosevelt administration. Hull knew him and felt he was one
newsman he could trust. The secretary of state handed him copies of
some of the Tokyo intercepts concerning Pearl Harbor. He said the
Japanese were planning to strike the base and that FDR planned to let it
happen. Hull made Leib pledge to keep his name out of it, but hoped he
could blow the story sky-high in the newspapers.

Leib ran to the office of his friend Lyle Wilson, the Washington
bureau chief of United Press. While keeping his pledge to Hull, he told
Wilson the details and showed him the intercepts. Wilson replied that
the story was ludicrous and refused to run it. Through connections, Leib
managed to get a hurried version onto UP’s foreign cable, but only one
newspaper carried any part of it.

After Pearl Harbor, Lyle Wilson called Leib to his office. He handed
him a copy of FDR’s just-released “day of infamy” speech. The two men
wept. Leib recounted his story in the History Channel documentary,
“Sacrifice at Pearl Harbor.”

The foregoing represents just a sampling of evidence that Washington knew in advance of the Pearl Harbor attack. For additional evidences, see Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath by Pulitzer Prize-winning historian John Toland, and Day of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor by Robert Stinnett.*
So certain was the data that, at a private press briefing in November
1941, General George Marshall confidently predicted that a
Japanese-American war would break out during the “first ten days of
December.”

However, none of this information was passed to our commanders in
Hawaii, Kimmel and Short, with the exception of Ambassador Grew’s
January warning, a copy of which reached Kimmel on February 1st. To
allay any concerns, Lieutenant Commander McCollum — who originated the
plan to incite Japan to war — wrote Kimmel: “Naval Intelligence places
no credence in these rumors. Furthermore, based on known data regarding
the present disposition and deployment of Japanese naval and army
forces, no move against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for in
the foreseeable future.”

Sitting Ducks

To ensure a successful Japanese attack — one that would enrage
America into joining the war — it was vital to keep Kimmel and Short out
of the intelligence loop. However, Washington did far more than this to
facilitate the Japanese assault.

On November 25th, approximately one hour after the Japanese attack
force left port for Hawaii, the U.S. Navy issued an order forbidding
U.S. and Allied shipping to travel via the North Pacific. All
transpacific shipping was rerouted through the South Pacific. This order
was even applied to Russian ships docked on the American west coast.
The purpose is easy to fathom. If any commercial ship accidentally
stumbled on the Japanese task force, it might alert Pearl Harbor. As
Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner, the Navy’s War Plans officer in 1941,
frankly stated: “We were prepared to divert traffic when we believed war
was imminent. We sent the traffic down via the Torres Strait, so that
the track of the Japanese task force would be clear of any traffic.”

The Hawaiian commanders have traditionally been censured for failing
to detect the approaching Japanese carriers. What goes unsaid is that
Washington denied them the means to do so. An army marching overland
toward a target is easily spotted. But Hawaii is in the middle of the
ocean. Its approaches are limitless and uninhabited. During the week
before December 7th, naval aircraft searched more than two million
square miles of the Pacific — but never saw the Japanese force. This is
because Kimmel and Short had only enough planes to survey one-third of
the 360-degree arc around them, and intelligence had advised
(incorrectly) that they should concentrate on the Southwest.

Radar, too, was insufficient. There were not enough trained
surveillance pilots. Many of the reconnaissance craft were old and
suffered from a lack of spare parts. The commanders’ repeated requests
to Washington for additional patrol planes were turned down. Rear
Admiral Edward T. Layton, who served at Pearl Harbor, summed it up in
his book And I Was There:
“There was never any hint in any intelligence received by the local
command of any Japanese threat to Hawaii. Our air defenses were stripped
on orders from the army chief himself. Of the twelve B-17s on the
island, only six could be kept in the air by cannibalizing the others
for spare parts.”

The Navy has traditionally followed the rule that, when international
relations are critical, the fleet puts to sea. That is exactly what
Admiral Kimmel did. Aware that U.S.-Japanese relations were
deteriorating, he sent 46 warships safely into the North Pacific in late
November 1941 — without notifying Washington. He even ordered the fleet
to conduct a mock air raid on Pearl Harbor, clairvoyantly selecting the
same launch site Admiral Yamamoto chose two weeks later.

When the White House learned of Kimmel’s move it countermanded his
orders and ordered all ships returned to dock, using the dubious excuse
that Kimmel’s action might provoke the Japanese. Washington knew that if
the two fleets met at sea, and engaged each other, there might be
questions about who fired the first shot.

Kimmel did not give up, however. With the exercise canceled, his
carrier chief, Vice Admiral William “Bull” Halsey, issued plans for a
25-ship task force to guard against an “enemy air and submarine attack”
on Pearl Harbor. The plan never went into effect. On November 26th,
Admiral Stark, Washington’s Chief of Naval Operations, ordered Halsey to
use his carriers to transport fighter planes to Wake and Midway islands
— further depleting Pearl Harbor’s air defenses.

It was clear, of course, that once disaster struck Pearl Harbor,
there would be demands for accountability. Washington seemed to artfully
take this into account by sending an ambiguous “war warning” to Kimmel,
and a similar one to Short, on November 27th. This has been used for
years by Washington apologists to allege that the commanders should have
been ready for the Japanese.

Indeed, the message began conspicuously: “This dispatch is to be
considered a war warning.” But it went on to state: “The number and
equipment of Japanese troops and the organizations of naval task forces
indicates an amphibious expedition against the Philippines, Thai or Kra
Peninsula, or possibly Borneo.” None of these areas was closer than
5,000 miles to Hawaii! No threat to Pearl Harbor was hinted at. It ended
with the words: “Continental districts, Guam, Samoa take measures
against sabotage.” The message further stated that “measures should be
carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil population.” Both
commanders reported the actions taken to Washington. Short followed
through with sabotage precautions, bunching his planes together (which
hinders saboteurs but makes ideal targets for bombers), and Kimmel
stepped up air surveillance and sub searches. If their response to the
“war warning” was insufficient, Washington said nothing. The next day, a
follow-up message from Marshall’s adjutant general to Short warned
only: “Initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide
for protection of your establishments, property, and equipment against
sabotage, protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and
protection of all activities against espionage.”

Thus things stood as Japan prepared to strike. Using the Purple code,
Tokyo sent a formal statement to its Washington ambassadors. It was to
be conveyed to the American Secretary of State on Sunday, December 7th.
The statement terminated relations and was tantamount to a declaration
of war. On December 6th, in Washington, the War and Navy departments had
already decrypted the first 13 parts of this 14-part message. Although
the final passage officially severing ties had not yet come through, the
fiery wording made its meaning obvious. Later that day, when Lieutenant
Lester Schulz delivered to President Roosevelt his copy of the
intercept, Schulz heard FDR say to his advisor, Harry Hopkins, “This
means war.”

During subsequent Pearl Harbor investigations, both General Marshall,
Army Chief of Staff, and Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations,
denied any recollection of where they had been on the evening of
December 6th — despite Marshall’s reputation for a photographic memory.
But James G. Stahlman, a close friend of Navy Secretary Frank Knox, said
Knox told him FDR convened a high-level meeting at the White House that
evening. Knox, Marshall, Stark, and War Secretary Stimson attended.
Indeed, with the nation on war’s threshold, such a conference only made
sense. That same evening, the Navy Department received a request from
Stimson for a list of the whereabouts of all ships in the Pacific.

On the morning of December 7th, the final portion of Japan’s lengthy
message to the U.S. government was decoded. Tokyo added two special
directives to its ambassadors. The first directive, which the message
called “very important,” was to deliver the statement at 1 p.m. The
second directive ordered that the last copy of code, and the machine
that went with it, be destroyed. The gravity of this was immediately
recognized in the Navy Department: Japan had a long history of
synchronizing attacks with breaks in relations; Sunday was an abnormal
day to deliver diplomatic messages — but the best for trying to catch
U.S. armed forces at low vigilance; and 1 p.m. in Washington was shortly
after dawn in Hawaii!

Admiral Stark arrived at his office at 9:25 a.m. He was shown the
message and the important delivery time. One junior officer pointed out
the possibility of an attack on Hawaii; another urged that Kimmel be
notified. But Stark refused; he did nothing all morning. Years later, he
told the press that his conscience was clear concerning Pearl Harbor
because all his actions had been dictated by a “higher authority.” As
Chief of Naval Operations, Stark had only one higher authority:
Roosevelt.

In the War Department, where the 14-part statement had also been
decoded, Colonel Rufus Bratton, head of the Army’s Far Eastern section,
discerned the message’s significance. But the chief of intelligence told
him nothing could be done until Marshall arrived. Bratton tried
reaching Marshall at home, but was repeatedly told the general was out
horseback riding. The horseback ride turned out to be a long one. When
Bratton finally reached Marshall by phone and told him of the emergency,
Marshall said he would come to the War Department. Marshall took 75
minutes to make the 10-minute drive. He didn’t come to his office until
11:25 a.m. — an extremely late hour with the nation on the brink of war.
He perused the Japanese message and was shown the delivery time. Every
officer in Marshall’s office agreed these indicated an attack in the
Pacific at about 1 p.m. EST. The general finally agreed that Hawaii
should be alerted, but time was running out.

Marshall had only to pick up his desk phone to reach Pearl Harbor on
the transpacific line. Doing so would not have averted the attack, but
at least our men would have been at their battle stations. Instead, the
general wrote a dispatch. After it was encoded it went to the Washington
office of Western Union. From there it was relayed to San Francisco.
From San Francisco it was transmitted via RCA commercial radio to
Honolulu. General Short received it six hours after the attack. Two
hours later it reached Kimmel. One can imagine their exasperation on
reading it.

Despite all the evidence accrued through Magic and other sources
during the previous months, Marshall had never warned Hawaii. To
historians — ignorant of that classified evidence — it would appear the
general had tried to save Pearl Harbor, “but alas, too late.” Similarly,
FDR sent a last-minute plea for peace to Emperor Hirohito. Although
written a week earlier, he did not send it until the evening of December
6th. It was to be delivered by Ambassador Grew, who would be unable to
receive an audience with the emperor before December 8th. Thus the
message could not conceivably have forestalled the attack — but
posterity would think that FDR, too, had made “a valiant, last effort.”

The Roberts Commission, assigned to investigate the Japanese attack,
consisted of personal cronies of Roosevelt and Marshall. The Commission
fully absolved Washington and declared that America was caught off guard
due to “dereliction of duty” by Kimmel and Short. The wrath of America
for these two was exceeded only by its wrath for Tokyo. To this day,
many believe it was negligence by the Hawaii commanders that made the
Pearl Harbor disaster possible.

* Though a major exposer of the Pearl Harbor
conspiracy, Robert Stinnett is sympathetic regarding FDR’s motives. He
writes in his book: “As a veteran of the Pacific War, I felt a sense of
outrage as I uncovered secrets that had been hidden from Americans for
more than fifty years. But I understood the agonizing dilemma faced by
President Roosevelt. He was forced to find circuitous means to persuade
an isolationist America to join in a fight for freedom.” In our view, a
government that is allowed to operate in such fashion is a government
that has embarked on a dangerous, slippery slope toward dictatorship.
Nonetheless, Stinnett’s position on FDR’s motives makes his exposé of
FDR’s actions all the more compelling.

This article, slightly revised, originally appeared under the
title “Pearl Harbor: The Facts Behind the Fiction” in the June 4, 2001
issue of The New American.

Photo at top: AP Images

Related articles:

Pearl Harbor: Motives Behind the Betrayal

Pearl Harbor: Scapegoating Kimmel and Short